BC Unequal Family Property Division Lawyers 604-602-9000

MacLean Law stands at the forefront of  legal advice and strategies to successfully resolve BC family and excluded property valuation and division. We have 4 offices across BC. We provide sound strategies to help our clients resolve their family matter and enable them to move forward in their lives.

Lorne MacLean, QC BC unequal family property division family lawyer

Court Awards Starting Value of BC Excluded Property To Husband

The first BC Family Law Act unequal family property division case was just decided by BC Supreme Court Justice Truscott in Williams v. Killey. With recent huge gains on Vancouver and BC land prices this case packs a legal punch.

At issue in the case was whether both parties ever lived in a short term marriage like relationship that would permit a family property division claim and if so should the division be one sided or equal.  Secondly, what if any spousal support should be payable after a relationship of under 4 years where the husband earned roughly $100,000 more than the wife. In the end result the husband prevailed in having  both the starting value of his home RRSP and car found to be his alone as BC excluded property and their gain in value then further divided unequally in his favour.

Surprising Unequal Family Property Division Of Gain In Value Of Excluded Property

Mort interestingly for our family law clients, was the judge’s decision to divide the gain in value on these excluded assets substantially unequally in the husband’s favour! The new act was thought to make the standard for departing from the equal division of family property including the gain on excluded property much more difficult so cases would be more predictable and easier to settle. This new case may throw a monkey wrench into that concept.

Was There An Error In Using Old BC Unequal Family Property Division Case Law?

The cases relied upon to justify unequal division of property of between 10-15 % likely came from our old Family Relations Act which did not exclude the starting vale of property brought into short term relationships. This case may be viewed with some skepticism as there seems to be a double deduction if the new act’s excluded property scheme is then further modified by reductions for short relationships by way of unequal division based. At the same time, if all the gain on real property comes passively from market conditions isn’t there still a windfall for sharing the gain for the spouse who didn’t contribute to this asset?

Here are the key parts of the BC unequal family property division decision: 

 [18]         Alternatively, he submits that if the two year period has been met then the growth in value of his assets should be apportioned entirely in his favour, or the claimant should only be entitled to $10,800, being 10% of the growth in the value of his townhome, and her other claims should be dismissed including her spousal support claim because it should be subsumed in her share of his assets.

 

85 (1) The following is excluded from family property:

(a) property acquired by a spouse before the relationship between the spouses began;

…

95 (1) The Supreme Court may order an unequal division of family property or family debt, or both, if it would be significantly unfair to

(a) equally divide family property or family debt, or both,…

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), the Supreme Court may consider one or more of the following:

(a) the duration of the relationship between the spouses;

…

(i) any other factor, other than the consideration referred to in subsection (3), that may lead to significant unfairness.

(3) The Supreme Court may consider also the extent to which the financial means and earning capacity of a spouse have been affected by the responsibilities and other circumstances of the relationship between the spouses if, on making a determination respecting spousal support, the objectives of spousal support under section 161 [objectives of spousal support] have not been met.

96 The Supreme Court must not order a division of excluded property unless

…

(b) it would be significantly unfair not to divide excluded property on consideration of

(i) the duration of the relationship between the spouses, and

(ii) a spouse’s direct contribution to the preservation, maintenance, improvement, operation or management of excluded property.

Property Division

[61]         The assets to consider for division under s. 95 of the FLA, either by way of equal division or unequal division, are the net values of the respondent’s townhome, his RRSPs, and his vehicle. [62]         Section 85 of the FLA excludes from consideration property acquired by a spouse prior to the relationship between the spouses beginning, while s. 84(2)(g) modifies that somewhat by including within family property the amount by which the value of excluded property has increased since the later of the date the relationship between the spouses began or the excluded property was acquired. [63]         On the evidence the respondent’s townhome, his RRSPs, and presumably his vehicle as well, were all acquired prior to the common law relationship beginning with the claimant. Therefore all are excluded property. [64]         Applying s. 84(2)(g) to these assets, the parties agree the townhome increased in net equity by $107,173 during their relationship, and the RRSPs increased in value by $96,661. [65]         There is no evidence of any increase in the value of the respondent’s vehicle during their relationship so I will not consider that item as part of excluded property for consideration. [66]         His vehicle had a fair market value as at November 1, 2012 of $17,000 with no evidence of its original purchase price. It is a safe assumption by the make of the vehicle that it was worth a lot more when it was first purchased and actually lost value during the relationship.

[67]         Section 95 is the re-apportion section of the FLA. Here under s. (a), the duration of the common law relationship between the parties is to be considered, which was approximately three and one-half years. Under s. (i), the only other factor applicable would appear to be one that results in significant unfairness.

[68]         The respondent’s cases I consider to be a lot more helpful than the claimant’s cases and they put the contribution of a spouse in a short term relationship as being valued at 10-15% of property.

[69]         The claimant here did contribute significantly to the household expenses and to the preservation and maintenance of the townhome. I consider it would be significantly unfair to her for her efforts to be denied any part of the increase in the townhome which was due only to market forces while she resided there. [70]         I award the claimant 15% of the $107,173 increase in net value of the townhome during their relationship time. The amount awarded for the increase is $16,075.95. [71]         RRSPs are family property by virtue of s. 84(2)(e). The respondent’s RRSPs were acquired prior to the relationship so s. 85(1) is also applicable to the RRSPs as excluded property. [72]         However, again, s. 84(2)(g) takes into account any increase in excluded property during the relationship for the purpose of division and brings into play as well s. 95 for re-apportion purposes. [73]         While the respondent’s RRSPs increased in value by $96,661 during the relationship, during that same period of time the evidence is that he contributed over $85,000 to his RRSPs. [74]         In these circumstances, I apportion the RRSPs 100% to the respondent.

Spousal support

[85]         The claimant continued to work at her chosen employment during the length of the relationship. She did not suffer any adverse economic consequences to that employment from the relationship. [86]         She was offered two other positions outside of her normal employment, that were slightly more remunerative. However she did not take up either of these positions in order to remain near the respondent. [87]         While this might be considered an economic disadvantage arising from the relationship, it is at most a very minor disadvantage. [88]         In all the circumstances I award a lump sum amount of $10,000.

Our BC family property division lawyers will help you make sense of what is a fair family and excluded property division and explain strategies to plan ahead for marriage or relationship breakdown.  

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First BC Family Debt Division Case Decided By BC Supreme Court

Our new BC Family Law Act sets out a new test for how family debts are to be valued and divided. The first Supreme Court decision on BC family family debt has just been pronounced being K.M.J. v. J.H.D.N. It answers important questions on what happens to family debt that goes up or down after separation.

Spencer MacLean, MacLean Law family debt division lawyer

Lorne MacLean, QC helped establish the law on family debts in his Supreme Court of Canada appearance in Young v. Young and he and the rest of the MacLean Law lawyers looked forward to guidance from the Courts on the following questions:

Is it appropriate for  a spouse to refuse to pay down debts in their own name or to fail to pay their share of debts after separation?

Should BC Family Debt Division credit be given to a spouse who responsibly pays down or family pays off debts before trial or settlement?

Common sense says the rules should encourage parties to behave responsibly. This week the BC Supreme Court decided responsible debtors should receive credit for paying down BC family debt.

[136]     In order to resolve the division of debt in this case, it is necessary to interpret ss. 86 and 87 of the relatively new Family Law Act, which has not yet been thoroughly undertaken by this court to my knowledge. In Asselin v. Roy, 2013 BCSC 1681, Harvey J. referred to the intent of the Act in this part and said it was to provide “more certainty for litigants” and that the “broad judicial discretion formerly available under the Family Relations Act has been replaced with a more formulaic approach to both the identification and division of family property”. His analysis is not directly on point, however.

FLA Test For Responsibility To Share In BC Family Debt Division

Equal entitlement and responsibility

81 Subject to an agreement or order that provides otherwise and except as set out in this Part and Part 6 [Pension Division],

(a) spouses are both entitled to family property and responsible for family debt, regardless of their respective use or contribution, and

(b) on separation, each spouse has a right to an undivided half interest in all family property as a tenant in common, and is equally responsible for family debt. 

[155]     The process outlined here will hopefully assist in ensuring that the process of valuing property and debts is clear and consistent and ultimately fair. If family property is disposed of after separation but before the hearing date, not in good faith (s. 95(2)(g) specifies good faith as a relevant consideration), that cannot deprive the other spouse of the value of their interest in the property. If it were disposed of in good faith, presumably s. 87 would be used to select the disposition date as the valuation date. Similarly, the good faith retirement of all or some of a family debt post-separation but before hearing cannot relieve the other spouse of their obligation to share in that family debt. The Act specifies that we start with the value at hearing date, but provides tools in ss. 87 and 95 to adapt to the peculiar circumstances that might arise to achieve the intent of the legislation. [156]     Some examples may be useful. I will use a line of credit as the family debt throughout, for consistency. In these examples, I will assume that the starting debt meets the definition of family debt at the date of separation.

-       If the principle debt remained static post-separation but interest accumulated, then the value should be the new balance including accumulated interest at the date of hearing.

-       If the amount of the debt was identical at hearing date and separation date but one party had used the line of credit during the period, such that the amount of debt had been much higher and/or much lower between those dates, the value would still be the balance at hearing plus some interest adjustment. The interest would have to be adjusted using s. 95, taking into account the balance at separation and whether the use post-separation resulted in greater interest accumulation than would have otherwise occurred, and whether those charges or other charges have increased the debt “beyond market trends”.

-       If the debt was paid off entirely by one spouse post-separation but pre‑hearing leaving nothing to divide at the hearing date, s. 87 allowing the court to set a different valuation date should be used or, perhaps, s. 95 would be used to correct what may be a significant unfairness through division of other property or debts. I would use s. 87. Interest accumulated to the date the debt was retired would need to be considered. The same process would be applied if the debt had been paid down but not retired entirely.

-       If the debt had been run up well above the separation date level, so that the value was significantly different at hearing, this significant unfairness could again be addressed through the application of ss. 87 or 95. The peculiar circumstances of each case may drive the selection of which section to use and the date to be selected.

[157]     These examples involve variations in the debt related to payments or interest; true monetary influences. The respondent’s consumer proposal here reminds us that separate from market trends and such true monetary influences, there can be changes to debts for another reason – compromise. Whether through a statutory process such as the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act or otherwise, creditors and debtors often negotiate reduced payment in exchange for either or both of prompt and certain payment.

Call Our Highly Respected BC Family Debt Division To Protect Yourself

The highly respected lawyers at MacLean Law would be pleased to meet with you to provide you with a strategy to resolve your family matter so you can move forward with your life. Contact us across BC at our offices in Kelowna, Surrey, Fort St John and Vancouver BC.

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BC Proprietary Estoppel Lawyers

Our BC family property division and estate litigation and Will dispute lawyers handle a variety of family and estate dispute claims. The BC Court of Appeal has just released an interesting decision concerning how a promise from a parent, a parent in law, or even a stranger may be enforced on equitable grounds. This new decision also high lights how new remedial legislation under section 58 of our Wills and Estates Succession act (“WESA”) laws would likely have led to a different result in court than under BC’s old Wills laws. The BCCA disputed Will decision in Sabey clearly tells lawyers and their clients what the law of BC is on the concept of proprietary estoppel. Will makers should use a skilled lawyer to ensure their wishes are not short circuited. In the event a dispute arise you should contact us immediately at any of our 4 estate dispute and unfair Will lawyers offices.

Lorne MacLean, QC Vancouver Estate Dispute and Unfair Wills lawyer

When Is A BC Promise Regarding Property Enforceable?

• What would you expect if someone promised you an interest in, or full ownership of, a piece of land if you did certain things?
• What if based on that promise you worked long and hard improving that property. What if  you also gave up other job and career opportunities because you relied on the promise that if you worked hard you would get the land?
• What happens if you already received a benefit from the person who made the promise?
• What if, instead of receiving the land, the a deceased Will maker leaves you a money bequest instead worth far less,  even though they wrote a defective follow up codicil to their Will indicating you were to get the whole property?
• What happens to the other beneficiaries in the Will if you get the whole property?

BC Appeals Court Explains BC Proprietary Estoppel

Beginning in 2001, the respondent, Mr. Sabey worked and studied dressage on the von Hopffgartens’ farm and received assurances from the von Hopffgartens that he would eventually inherit the farm. When Ms. von Hopffgarten died in May 2011, her will left the farm to the appellant, Ms. Rommel. At trial, Mr. Sabey was awarded the farm on the basis of proprietary estoppel. The appellant challenges the trial judge’s finding that the test for proprietary estoppel has been met.

Held: Appeal allowed, Justice MacKenzie dissenting. Majority (per Justice Bennett and Justice Neilson): The extent of Mr. Sabey’s detrimental reliance was far less than that assessed by the trial judge. Awarding Mr. Sabey the farm was far out of proportion to the detriment he suffered. The decision of the trial judge is set aside, and the case is remitted to the trial judge to assess the outstanding claims of unjust enrichment and express or implied trust, as well as the issue of proportionality as it relates to proprietary estoppel. Dissent (per Justice MacKenzie): The appeal should be dismissed. Reliance and detriment are largely factual findings attracting a deferential standard. Similarly, determinations of remedy also attract deference. It cannot be said the trial judge failed to apply the relevant principles or gave insufficient weight to the relevant circumstances.

 What Is The Test For BC Proprietary Estoppel?

In a 2:1 decision the BC Court of Appeal reviewed and restated the law for a successful proprietary estoppel claim. In a nutshell there is no free ride in proprietary estoppel claims. To win you must prove a net detriment after the credits and debits related to the representions that were made.

[28]         This statement was referred to by Madam Justice Newbury in her concurring reasons in Trethewey-Edge Dyking District at para. 64. In her view, based on the formulation in Taylors Fashions Ltd. v. Liverpool Trustees Co. Ltd., [1982] 1 Q.B. 133 (Ch. Div.), an equity is established if, first, the defendants by their words or conduct encouraged the plaintiff to believe that they did not intend to rely on their strict legal rights (at para. 70), and second, if, in all the circumstances, it would be unconscionable for the defendants to go back on the assumption they had allowed the plaintiffs to make (at para. 73). If these requirements were met, then the final question; what is the remedy appropriate to satisfy the equity (at para. 75).

 

[30]         Although the test for proprietary estoppel has been framed in many different ways in the case law, it always bears the same essential qualities. In my view, they can be summarized as follows:

1. Is an equity established? An equity will be established where:
2. There was an assurance or representation, attributable to the owner, that the claimant has or will have some right to the property, and
3. The claimant relied on this assurance to his or her detriment so that it would be unconscionable for the owner to go back on that assurance.
4. If an equity is established, the court must determine the extent of the equity and the remedy appropriate to satisfy the equity.

[31]         This means that Mr. Sabey must demonstrate that the von Hopffgartens assured him that he would inherit the farm, and that he relied on this assurance to his detriment to the extent that it would be unconscionable for him not to receive an interest in the farm. The court must then go on to determine the relief appropriate to satisfy the equity that Mr. Sabey has established.

 

[42]         A similar description was adopted in Ryan v. Moore, 2005 SCC 38. Although this case dealt with estoppel by convention and estoppel by representation, the court’s comments on detrimental reliance apply equally in the case of proprietary estoppel. The court held that the requirement of detrimental reliance lies at the heart of true estoppel (at para. 68). The court provided the following definition: [69]      Detrimental reliance encompasses two distinct, but interrelated, concepts: reliance and detriment. The former requires a finding that the party seeking to establish the estoppel changed his or her course of conduct by acting or abstaining from acting in reliance upon the assumption, thereby altering his or her legal position. If the first step is met, the second requires a finding that, should the other party be allowed to abandon the assumption, detriment will be suffered by the estoppel raiser because of the change from his or her assumed position (see Wilken [Wilken and Villiers: The Law of Waiver, Variation and Estoppel, 2d. ed. (New York: Oxford, 2002)], at p. 228; Grundt v. Great Boulder Proprietary Gold Mines Ltd. (1937), 59 C.L.R. 641 (Austl. H.C.), at p. 674). [Emphasis added.]

[43]         Therefore the question is whether Mr. Sabey altered his position or changed his course of conduct because of the assurance that he would inherit the farm. The trial judge found that he did and addressed reliance and detriment together.

 

Sabey Never Gave Up Career Options

Ever heard of the phrase “there is no free ride in life?”. The Court of Appeal rejected that Sabey gave up his horse dressage career and also rejected that Sabey chose a local accounting course and job because of the promise he would receive the farm. The Court of Appeal then accepted that unpaid work versus benefits Sabey received could found some compensation. The Court of Appeal majority felt the error was when the trial judge conflated reliance by Sabey on the deceased’s promise of a gift of the farm with an automatic conclusion of detrimental reliance.

[55]         This brief analysis in Belvedere suggests two things: first, detriment does not automatically flow from reliance, and second, detriment must be assessed on a holistic basis, with a view to looking at both the overall benefits gained and losses suffered by the claimant.

The majority then analyzed, what if any, detrimental reliance actually occurred as opposed to the trial judge’s error which assumed a detriment merely upon proof of reliance on a promise. They found little detriment and certainly not the level of detrimental reliance that justify Sabey receiving the entire farm.

….If he had wanted to, he could have taken over the farm at any time and he could have pursued professional riding. But he did not. If he had taken over the farm after Dietrich’s death then he would not have been able to pursue his accounting career. He could not devote himself fully to both. Ultimately, Mr. Sabey did not choose professional dressage or the farm; he chose to expand his accounting career and to ride and teach lessons on the side. The evidence does not support any detriment in terms of career choice, and as indicated, neither were pleaded as detrimental reliance.

Unpaid Or Lower Paid Work By Sabey

[67]         Although the evidence regarding the value of the work Mr. Sabey did on the farm is scant, it seems that Mr. Sabey received less compensation than other working students, and later he received no compensation at all. The trial judge also found that the reason Mr. Sabey accepted his lack of compensation was that he expected to inherit the farm. These findings of detrimental reliance in relation to Mr. Sabey’s uncompensated contributions to the farm are clearly supported by the record.

 

81]         It is important to keep in mind that the issue in this case is not the intention of the deceased, but whether a gift in a valid will should be set aside, and in what circumstances.

[82]         Mr. Sabey argues unconscionability. In my opinion, it is unconscionable to set aside the gift in the will and give Mr. Sabey the farm given the limited extent of his detriment. [83]         In my respectful opinion, the record and the law do not support the conclusion of the trial judge to award Mr. Sabey the entire farm. Mr. Sabey raised two other bases for his claim: unjust enrichment and express or implied trust. A pleading of secret trust was abandoned at trial. The trial judge did not address these claims given his finding of proprietary estoppel. The case should be returned to the trial judge to assess these claims based on the evidence he heard at trial. The issue of proportionality was not argued before or decided by the trial judge. As this case is remitted for reconsideration on the outstanding issues, it is open to the trial judge to also assess the issue of proportionality based on the trial evidence. [84]         Mr. Sabey received a gift of $100,000 from Kim’s US estate. This gift was not raised in this appeal so I make no comment on its relevance, except to note in Watts & Ready, other gifts were considered in assessing detriment and equity. [85]         I would allow the appeal, set aside the decision of the trial judge and remit the case to the trial judge to assess the outstanding claims of unjust enrichment and express or implied trust, as well as the issue of proportionality as it relates to the claim of proprietary estoppel. I would order costs payable from the estate.

 

Minority Disagrees and Supports Trial Judge

[122]     In my opinion, this case falls within the line of cases in which the detriment cannot be easily quantified, given the complexity of the relationships and motivations of the parties involved, and the benefits they received. In my view, it was appropriate for the judge to have assessed the detriment suffered by Mr. Sabey “in the round”, including a consideration of the context of Mr. Sabey’s relationship with Dietrich and Kim, while looking after their farm. It was open to him to determine Mr. Sabey should be awarded the farm in these circumstances. [123]     The remedy is the result of a broad discretion exercised by the trial judge in the totality of the circumstances as he interpreted them. I cannot conclude the judge “acted on a wrong principle, or failed to give sufficient weight to all relevant considerations”: Parminter v. Parminter, 2011 BCCA 347 at para. 16, 340 D.L.R. (4th) 651, citing Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (Minister of Transport), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 3, 88 D.L.R. (4th) 1; Harelkinv. University of Regina, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 561, 96 D.L.R. (3d) 14; and MiningWatch Canada v. Canada (Fisheries and Oceans), 2010 SCC 2, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 6. [124]     In summary, there is no “benchmark” for unconscionability – the analysis is to be individualized. I see no error in the reasoning of the trial judge. His conclusion was reasonably supported by the evidence.

Our WESA dispute, proprietary estoppel and trust claim and unfair Will Variation lawyers can help you obtain a fair estate dispute resolution. Call us toll free at 1-877-602-9900.

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BC Family Law Business Division and Valuation

When BC high income and high net worth spouses separate their BC family property, assets and their family debts need to be valued and fairly divided.  Without skilled and experienced legal help thousands if not millions of dollars in real family asset value may be lost. Here are a few examples of traps and pitfalls:

Lorne MacLean, QC, BC Family Law Act Business Valuation and Division Lawyer 604-602-9000

• Did you know that not all family assets have equal value?
• Did you know that cash in the bank is worth more than an RRSP of equal value?
• Did you know a family home is worth more than a business of equal value?
• Did you know you may be entitled to discount or reduction and even a payment plan for buying a spouse out of certain assets?
• Did you know corporate reorganizations may help reduce tax so there is more for each spouse?

Our BC high net worth family law clients are often surprised to learn about these valuation concepts at their first strategy session with us. The reason certain assets with a similar value, may be actually far different in value upon closer analysis, comes down to the income taxes that are payable on some types of assets and income taxes that are not payable at all on others.

BC Courts Have Growing Acceptance That Taxes Are Not Speculative 

BC Courts are becoming very savvy in dealing with the income tax consequences of dividing various family property and more receptive to making reductions for compensation payments where one spouse buys out the other’s share in such an asset. BC Family Law Business Division cases need a distributive income tax analysis by a top lawyer acting for you.

The recent BC Court of Appeal decision in Mckenzie v. Mckenzie  allowed an appeal concerning a husband receiving more than half of his real estate and operating business and the Appeal Court granted him a 90/10 unequal division in his favour of a largely passive real estate investment business he owned before a 12 year marriage. The official headnote states the change the Court of Appeal Made to the trial decision after the appeal:

All of Mr. McKenzie’s business assets are owned by his holding company. The judge found the holding company to be a family asset. The judge erred in reapportioning the assets on the basis of a 70/30 division under s. 65 of the FRA by ignoring that the majority of the assets were passive real estate investments acquired before the marriage. The Court set aside the judge’s division of 70/30 and ordered that the assets be reapportioned 90/10 in favour of Mr. McKenzie.

Distributive Taxes Really Diminish The Asset Value 

The BC Court of Appeal also remitted the valuation of the wife’s 10 percent interest in the BC Family Law Business Division case to the trial judge to decide if the payment should be reduced by up to 34% for distributive income tax consequences the husband might incur in buying out the wife’s 10 percent interest. Here is what they decided on this key issue: 

1. Tax or Discount Rate

[115]     Mr. McKenzie argues that the judge did not deal with the tax or discount rate which he argues should be applied to any amount payable to Ms. McKenzie as a compensation payment. He says that the $607,000 compensation payment Ms. McKenzie should receive from Camaxco should be discounted by 33.71%. Ms. McKenzie says that issue should be remitted to the trial judge who indicated that he would hear submissions on this question after the appeal. I agree that it is appropriate to remit this question to the trial judge for the purposes of determining if any reduction is appropriate and if so the amount: see, Laxton v. Coglon, 2008 BCCA 414.

How Do Distributive Taxes On Family Property Division Apply?

Madam Justice Dardi provided a nice summary of the law in a 2012 BC Supreme Court Case of L.F. v. B.F., 2012 BCSC 1073

[102]     The leading case on distributive taxes and valuation of assets is Halpin v. Halpin (1996), 27 B.C.L.R. (3d) 305 (C.A.). There is no absolute rule as to whether tax consequences should or should not be taken into account in the valuation of assets or in the determination of the appropriate compensation order: Oliver v. Oliver, 2011 BCSC 1126 at para. 52. In Halpin, Huddart J.A. cited with approval, at 323-324, the following statements by McKinlay J.A. in Sengmueller v. Sengmueller (1994), 17 O.R. (3d) 208 at 215 (C.A.):

If the evidence satisfies the trial judge, on a balance of probabilities, that the disposition of any item of family property will take place at a particular time in the future, then the tax consequences (and other properly proven costs of disposition) are not speculative, and should be allowed either as a reduction in value or as a deductible liability.

[103]     It is critical to the analysis to appreciate that compensation does not necessarily equate to “fair market value”: Blackett at 105; and Weintz v. Weintz, 2012 BCSC 120 at para. 129. The assessment of appropriate compensation “is not an exact science and is not a matter of precise accounting”: N.M.M. at para. 93. The following observation of Huddart J.A. in Kowalewich v. Kowalewich (1998), 50 B.C.L.R. (3d) 12 at 16 (C.A.) is instructive:

… As Madam Justice Southin reminded us in Blackett, section 66 is not an expropriation provision. It is a mechanism to adjust matters between spouses who do not wish to continue in their joint ventures as joint owners.

[104]     The authorities direct that the income tax consequences arising from the sale of an asset in order to realize the amount of compensation payable in respect of it are a relevant consideration and must be taken into account when determining the amount of the compensation order: Laxton at para. 52. On the other hand, the court should not take into account notional tax liability or speculative disposition costs in calculating an equalization payment where there is no evidence as to the likelihood or date of the other spouse incurring that loss: Dowling v. Dowling (1997), 43 B.C.L.R. (3d) 59 at 60-61 (C.A.); Rick v. Brandsema, 2009 SCC 10 at para. 55.

Lorne MacLean, QC has  over 30 years experience dealing with BC family law business division and the complex tax consequences that need to be carefully navigated. Call Lorne MacLean,QC if you have a high net worth BC family property division case where you cannot afford to make a mistake.

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Collaborative Law is an integrated cross-disciplinary system for problem solving in a separation and divorce situations.  The MacLean Family law lawyers coordinate their work with other collaborative professionals who specialize in addressing emotional and financial problems of divorce.  Other professionals may include communication coaches, financial planners, psychologists and child specialists.  Everyone works together as a team, seeking to de-escalate conflict and to help the couple or family restructure in a positive manner.

Good faith negotiations and resolutions

Collaborative law encourages and in fact mandates that the process be transparent or open and full disclosure between the parties in order that everyone can fairly, reasonably and fully negotiate a successful, good faith resolution.  This process is done outside of court and is a true team approach with open and honest communication.   Each lawyer is independent from the other and represents only one party in the process.  No one is allowed to use threats of abandoning the process or resorting to litigation as a way of forcing settlement.  In the event, that either party chooses to withdraw from the process and resort to litigation each of the lawyers must withdraw and cannot continue to act in the litigation process.

Each of the parties with the lawyers sign a binding agreement defining the scope and sole purpose of the lawyers’ representation:  to help the parties reach an agreement that meets the needs of the parties using creative problem solving, conflict resolution techniques and good faith negotiation.

Once an agreement (separation, divorce, support or parenting agreement)  has been reached using the collaborative family law process,  it becomes a legal contract.

Audra Bayer, Surrey and Kelowna family law mediator and arbitrator

If you would like to use a collaborative law process to resolve your separation, divorce or parenting arrangements call one of the top-ranked lawyers trained in mediation and arbitration at MacLean Law.

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BC Interim Spousal Support Pending Trial Is a Big Deal

Separating BC family law spouses will wait several months until a trial judge determines issues of permanent child custody, child support, spousal support and family property division. Delay or procrastination often makes matters worse so it is critical you hire an experienced family lawyer. MacLean Law helps people resolve matters so people can move forward positively with their lives.

MacLean Law Interim Spousal Support Lawyers 1-877-602-9900

Homemakers, lower income earning spouses and children must be financially supported during the interim period from separation until the parties settle or the trial occurs and decides the disputed financial and other issues. Courts can act quickly to make awards of interim spousal support and interim child support.

But how does the court decide the proper amount of interim spousal support to be fair to the paying and receiving spouse?

The recent BC interim spousal support case of Hughes v. Erickson provides a great summary explaining how Judges and Masters in BC decide the proper amount of spousal support.

BC Interim Spousal Support Looks At Needs and Means and SSAG

[36]         Ms. Hughes seeks interim spousal support under the “with child support” formula in accordance with the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines. [37]         There is no doubt that the parties were spouses within the meaning of s. 3 of the FLA. The following provisions of the FLA set out the basis for determining entitlement to, the amount of, and the duration of spousal support:

1. If, after considering the objectives set out in section 161 [objectives of spousal support], a spouse is entitled to spousal support, the other spouse has a duty to provide support for the spouse in accordance with section 162 [determining spousal support].
2. In determining entitlement to spousal support, the parties to an agreement or the court must consider the following objectives:

(a) to recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the relationship between the spouses or the breakdown of that relationship;

(b) to apportion between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of their child, beyond the duty to provide support for the child;

(c) to relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the relationship between the spouses;

(d) as far as practicable, to promote the economic self-sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period of time.

2. The amount and duration of spousal support, if any, must be determined on consideration of the conditions, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse, including the following:

(a) the length of time the spouses lived together;

(b) the functions performed by each spouse during the period they lived together;

(c) an agreement between the spouses, or an order, relating to the support of either spouse.

[38]         In Robles v. Kuhn, 2009 BCSC 1163 at para. 12, Master Keighley set out a useful set of principles governing interim support orders:

1. On applications for interim support the applicant’s needs and the respondent’s ability to pay assume greater significance: Gibb v. Gibb, [2005] B.C.J. No. 2730 (S.C.);
2. An interim support order should be sufficient to allow the applicant to continue living at the same standard of living enjoyed prior to separation if the payor’s ability to pay warrants it: Grossi v. Grossi, [1993] B.C.J. No. 878 (S.C.);
3. On interim support applications the court does not embark on an in-depth analysis of the parties’ circumstances which is better left to trial. The court achieves rough justice at best: Randhawa v. Randhawa, [1999] B.C.J. No. 3299; Newson v. Newson, [1998] B.C.J. No. 2906, 65 B.C.L.R. (3d) 22 (C.A.);
4. The courts should not unduly emphasise any one of the statutory considerations above others;
5. On interim applications the need to achieve economic self-sufficiency is often of less significance;
6. Interim support should be ordered within the range suggested by the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines unless exceptional circumstances indicate otherwise: Ladd v. Ladd, [2006] B.C.J. No. 1930, 2006 BCSC 1280 (S.C.);…

What Happens When There is Doubt That BC Interim Spousal Support Should Be Paid Before Trial?

[39]         The factors to be considered in respect of interim spousal support were described by Mr. Justice Barrow in B. (L.G.) v. M. (M.A.C), 2005 BCSC 1786. Two are particularly appropriate in the circumstances in this case: [14]          … First, given the limitations of both time and evidence which necessarily constrain interim applications, caution should be exercised before descending into the merits of an issue. The greater the need to resolve contested issues of fact, especially those going to a threshold issue as in this case, the more likely it is that the decision ought not to be made on an interim basis. [15]          Second, the need for caution is all the greater when, as a result of an interim order, money will be paid and there is an issue as to whether it can be recovered following a trial if it is determined that the recipient is not entitled to the funds.

In the end result the husband who was found to earn slightly more than $200,000 was ordered to pay significant interim spousal support on the “with child” formula.

[46]         Therefore, in respect of Ms. Hughes’ application for interim spousal support, I order the following: Mr. Erickson will pay all expenses on the Balsam Property, including mortgage payments, property taxes, insurance, repair and maintenance, and utilities, including cable, internet and telephone (excepting long distance and other service charges incurred by Ms. Hughes); and, in addition, Mr. Erickson will pay to Ms. Hughes the sum of $750, payable on the first day of every month.

Interim spousal support awards have a huge impact on settlement negotiations and even trial awards. You cannot afford to make a mistake that results in too high or too low of an interim spousal support award. Call us across BC toll free at 1-877-602-9900 and meet with us in Kelowna, Surrey, Fort St John and Vancouver.

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Appeals of BC  interim child custody and parenting orders are generally discouraged absent a compelling reason. A dispute as to what is in the best interests of a child in BC is better suited to be fully canvassed at trial, especially where significant factual and credibility issues are raised.

Lorne MacLean, Q.C. Family Appeals Lawyer

The goal is to ensure child parenting time, access and custody orders are settled or decided by a trial judge promptly so the child can develop properly and free from a prolonged and psychologically upsetting family law dispute. Our highly skilled and child focused lawyers will help you resolve difficult child custody, guardianship, parenting time and contact issues.

BC Family Orders Orders Need To Specify What Act

In Fitzgibbon v. Fitzgibbon 2014 BCCA 403 the BC Court of Appeal addressed firstly what Act they should govern the appeal:

 [14]         As a preliminary matter, counsel for the parties were asked to address the issue of whether the order under appeal was an interim order under the FLA and therefore a “limited appeal order” under s. 2.1 of the Court of Appeal Rules that required leave to appeal, or whether it was an interim order under the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2d Supp.) for which there continues to be a right of appeal (see Haigh v. Haigh (1987), 15 B.C.L.R. (2d) 375 (C.A.), and De Fehr v. De Fehr, 2002 BCCA 577).

[15]         The mother’s Notice of Family Claim sought relief under both acts while the father’s counterclaim sought relief only under the Divorce Act. Neither the December 6, 2013 order nor the April 3, 2014 order identified the act under which the orders were made although the language used in both appears to track the language of the FLA. The mother’s application was for a suspension of the “parenting arrangements” under the parties’ marriage agreement and the orders granted in response to her application purport to suspend the father’s “parenting time” and impose supervision of his “parenting time”, respectively. Our jurisprudence (see Hejzlar v. Mitchell-Hejzlar, 2011 BCCA 230; Yu v. Jordon, 2012 BCCA 367; and Supreme Court Family Rules, Appendix A, Form F52) requires the Act under which such orders are made to be specified. It is unclear why those requirements were not met in this case.

Interim Child Parenting Orders Involve Discretion And Should Be Respected

[20]    …. Rather the question is whether the judge erred in law in confirming the interim order for supervised access pending trial of the issue. [21]         In my view the April 3, 2014 interim order does not engage a question of law. Decisions regarding the guardianship, custody, parenting and access of children are inherently exercises of discretion by the judge and are therefore accorded deference on appeal. An appellate court may only interfere where there is a material error, serious misapprehension of the evidence, or an error of law: see Van de Perre v. Edwards, 2001 SCC 60, and Rick v. Brandsema, 2009 SCC 10. Here, the judge’s decision to confirm his December 6, 2013 interim order reflects an exercise of his discretion in weighing the new evidence and finding that it did not support a variation of the earlier interim order at that time. While the one-off nature of the alleged incident, the basis upon which the third-party decisions of the Crown and the MCFD were made, and the question of whether there is an ongoing need for continued supervision of the father’s access to the child may all be relevant factors for consideration in the final determination of this issue, it was, in my view, open to the judge to conclude that it was premature to change his December 6, 2013 interim order before the s. 211 report had been completed. His decision, by inference, reflects the view that the issue would be better addressed at the trial of the action where the factual and credibility issues may be fully canvassed. In short, I do not find his decision to dismiss the father’s application to vary the interim order for supervised access to demonstrate an error of law, but rather to reflect an exercise of his discretion in the weighing of the new evidence. Deference must be accorded to such a decision.

Interim Child Parenting Appeals Are Discouraged In Favour Of Prompt Trials

[22]         Interim orders are primarily designed to maintain the status quo and to provide short-term solutions until issues regarding the best interests of a child can be fully canvassed at trial: Johnson v. Jessel, 2012 BCCA 393 at para. 48; Leung v. Leung (1998), 44 R.F.L. (4th) 121 (B.C.C.A.) at para. 10; Eaton v. Eaton (1987), 11 R.F.L. (3d) 92 (B.C.C.A.); and Prost v. Prost (1990), 30 R.F.L. (3d) 80 (B.C.C.A.). In this case, the best interests of the child was at issue. The incident that gave rise to the supervision order was disputed. This raised issues of the parties’ credibility. The forum to resolve these issues and whether there is an ongoing need for supervision of the child are best resolved at trial and not by repeated interim applications. Appeals from interim orders on issues regarding the best interests of a child generally have been discouraged absent a compelling reason: see Haigh v. Haigh (1987), 9 R.F.L. (3d) 301 (B.C.C.A.). [23]         In these circumstances, it is critical that issues involving the best interests of a child be addressed in an expeditious manner by all involved. This Court has expressed its concern over delays in matters involving family law issues, and in particular those involving the custody of and access to children. [24]         In this case, the April 3, 2014 order included a provision for the preparation of a s. 211 report. We were advised that as of October 2, 2014, the hearing date of this appeal, the report has not been completed. The source of that delay is unclear. It is imperative that all parties to the litigation and their counsel take the necessary steps to secure the expeditious completion of this report and the early scheduling of the trial of this matter. The determination of the best interests of this child requires no less.

Studies show that the greatest predictor for poor outcomes for the healthy development of children is prolonged conflict. Call us to today across BC toll free 1-877-602-9900 to help you create a plan to end the conflict your child might face so they have the best chance to succeed in life. 

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A recent judgment in the British Columbia Court of Appeal shows a new and modern view by the Court of scrutinizing rigorously one’s entitlement to spousal support instead of the past, near routine application of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (SSAG) by judges. The SSAG guidelines do say that entitlement is a threshold issue to be decided before application of the guidelines. Yet, often in earlier cases, this threshold was deemed met simply based upon the fact that the SSAG spousal support calculation generated an amount payable and a duration for payment in a disputed spousal support case. Has the pendulum swung back on spousal support more towards the concept of self-sufficiency?

Before granting an order for spousal support under the Divorce Act, the Court must consider the objectives of such an order as stipulated in s.15.2(6):

15.2(6) An order made made under subsection

(1) or an interim order under subsection

(2) that provides support of a spouse should

a) recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown;

b) apportion between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over and above any obligation for the support of any child of the marriage

c) relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage; and

d) in so far as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period of time.

New Focus On Entitlement To Spousal Support 

Romney Burkett Paralegal Student and Legal Assistant

On October 9, 2014, judgment was pronounced in Lee v. Lee, 2014 BCCA 383, from an appeal by a husband who had been denied spousal support from his wife after a 20 year marriage where the wife earned a considerably higher income than the husband. Lee v. Lee is significant case law for husbands or wives who earn considerably higher incomes than their spouses. It also points out that entitlement issues regarding spousal support must be decided before any slavish application of the SSAG by  the court  in cases where the paying spouse cannot afford to pay the spousal support outlined in the SSAG, particularly where a lifestyle in the marriage was sustained through debt and/or refinancing.

Gender Income Gap

As of 2013, Statistics Canada and the Conference Board of Canada state that men are still continued to be paid higher than women who work in the same occupation by approximately 19%. This gender pay gap combined with the fact that women commonly sacrifice their career or vocational goals to run the family home, contributes to the ideology that wives are financially dependent upon their husbands; thus, allowing them -some people argue- to ride the so-called “alimony pony” automatically.

Is The Spousal Support Pendulum Swinging back to self Sufficiency?

The BCCA in Lee v. Lee questions this ideology and whether the government should be responsible for a disadvantaged spouse or should it automatically be spouse with the higher income, statistically more often the husband, that pays spousal support without looking at entitlement issues in a principled way:

2. …marriage is an economic partnership that is built upon a premise (albeit rebuttable) of mutual support. The real question in such cases is whether the state should automatically bear the costs of these realities, or whether the family, including former spouses, should be asked to contribute to the need, means permitting. Some suggest it would be better if the state automatically picked up the costs of such cases…However, as will be seen, Parliament and the legislatures have decreed otherwise by requiring courts to consider not only compensatory factors, but the “needs” and “means” of the parties. It is not a question of either one model or the other. It is rather a matter of applying the relevant factors and striking the balance that best achieves justice in the particular case before the court.
3. …Equalization of incomes, or even of lifestyles, is not a basis alone for non- compensatory spousal support. Still less is equalization of incomes each year….Loss of access to the fruits of the respondent’s future labour is not a recognized underpinning to entitlement to spousal support, absent other considerations (Griffiths v. Griffiths, 2011 ABCA 359),

The main factors to be considered in Lee v. Lee are the following:

1. Husband and wife were married for 20 years with no children. Husband is 56 and wife is 49.
2. Husband worked full-time as a car man with CN and worked part-time as a doorman at a bar. His annual income was $48,000.
3. Wife was attended university when the couple first met and worked part-time as a bartender. She earned her bachelor’s and master’s degrees and a teaching certificate. By 2005, she was a high school principle with an annual income of approximately $120,000.
4. In 2001, the husband suffered a motor vehicle accident and was unable to return to work at CN He began receiving disability and other benefits. He began working part-time as a personal trainer in 2004 and claimed to earn under $10,000 per annum; however, he never filed any tax returns to prove such claim.
5. The husband and wife lived an extravagant lifestyle – one which was far beyond their means. Both parties carried large amounts of debt; although, it was determined by the Court that the husband spent the most amount of money and it went to personal items rather than for a family purpose.
6. The wife made the mortgage payments and paid for other necessities for the family from her income.
7. Neither the husband nor the wife had suffered any economic disadvantage from the other during the course of the marriage.
8. Since separation, the husband has resided with his new partner, who earns approximately between $75,000 and $90,000 base salary, plus overtime.
9. As the husband did not file any tax returns and was paid by his clients in cash, he was unable to prove his actual income. The Court also determined on a balance of probabilities that the husband had chosen to be voluntarily unemployed and attributed a potential annual income to the husband in the range of $50,000 to $60,000 or more.
10. The wife voluntarily paid the husband a lump sum amount of $17,500 to assist him in adjusting to his new circumstances after the marriage breakdown.

Clean Break Versus Support being Used As a Tool For Income Redristribution

The Honourable Madam Justice Newbury explained how spousal support in the husband’s case would be viewed with relation to the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines:

5. If Mr. Lee ad not formed this new relationship, the case law in British Columbia would have permitted an award of spousal support to him, given the length of the parties’ marriage (which presumably creates interdependence) and the expansion of the meaning of “need” in the family law context. But whether it would have been a “material error” in law or a wrong exercise of discretion to refuse support in such circumstances is another matter. To rule as a matter of law that Mr. Lee should be compensated indefinitely for the “loss” of the ability to share in Ms. Lee’s income and lifestyle would, taken into its logical conclusion, mean that support must be ordered on one model or the other in virtually every case that comes before the court. The concept of need (in the true sense) of the applicant spouse would be supplanted by the sole criterion of the respondent spouse’s ability to pay. Marriage would, automatically entitle a spouse to the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage, or as much as the payor could afford. I respectfully agree with the Professor Rogerson’s suggestion, and with the Court in Griffiths, supra, that this cannot be correct. A ‘clean break’ is clearly possible in this case, and again as stated in Moge, the mere fact of marriage or its breakdown does not activate a “general tool of redistribution.”
6. At the same time, the case law of this province referred to above does indicate that a party who experiences a marked decline in standard of living due to divorce should receive some financial assistance (either in form of reapportionment of assets or maintenance) in adjusting to his or her new situation – hence the concept of a “transitional award”, which is recognized by the SSAG. Such awards have been made in favour of women, but rarely in favour of men, perhaps reflecting that, as Rogerson suggests, “Non-compensatory support is significantly structured by social norms of what is fair and just. The economic dependency of husbands on wives is not reinforced and naturalized by strong cultural norms, as is the dependency of wives on husbands…” (At 234-5.) It seems to me that, setting aside for the moment the support already paid by Ms. Lee from August 1, 2012 to June 1, 2013, Mr. Lee could have expected some transitional award, if only on the “principle” that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.

Based on the fact that the husband had already received some voluntary spousal support from the wife combined with the fact that he could not prove his actual income and was benefiting from contributing income in his new relationship, the Court determined that he should not receive ongoing spousal support. Furthermore, the standard of living enjoyed by the husband and wife during the marriage was considered “illusory” as it was sustained by a continuing cycle of debt and refinancing.

Romney Burkett

Legal Assistant/Paralegal Student

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Critical BC Family Law Service and Time Rules

One of the most important factors to thoroughly comprehend when handling a family law case, either as a lawyer or as a self-represented litigant, is service of court documents and the time restrictions enforced by the courts. Failure to properly serve, respond, or comply with court documents could result in default judgment being ordered against you; an order of Costs against you; or zero entitlement to receive any notice of any part of the family law case including, without limitation, any court appearance, hearing, conference or trial!

The majority of court documents served and/or received by litigants in a family law case will involve a time limitation. For example, a party has within 30 days to respond to a Notice of Family Claim, or a report of an expert appointed by a party must be served on the other party at least 84 days before a scheduled trial. But what exactly does “within” and “at least” mean in the context of these time limitations and how do you serve the opposing party?

ADDRESS FOR SERVICE

Supreme Court Family Rule 6-1(1) and (2) defines a party’s address for service:

Party must have address for service

(1)Each party to a family law case must,

(a) if the party is represented by a lawyer in the family law case, have, as the party’s address for service, an accessible address that is the office address of that lawyer, or

(b) if the party is not represented by a lawyer in the family law case,

(i)   have, as the party’s address for service, an accessible address within 30 kilometres of the registry, or

(ii)   if the party does not have an accessible address within 30 kilometres of the registry, have, as the party’s addresses for service, both

(A)  an accessible address, and

(B)  a postal address in British Columbia, a fax number or an e-mail address.

Additional addresses for service

(2)A party may have, in addition to the address or addresses for service the party is required to have under subrule (1), one or more of the following as addresses for service:

(a) a postal address;

(b) a fax number;

(c) an e-mail address.

PERSONAL SERVICE VERSUS ORDINARY SERVICE

Before I explain time calculations in family law, one must first understand the difference between personal service and ordinary service – the two styles used by the courts to serve documents on a party in a court action.

1. Unless the court otherwise orders, personal service of a document is effected on:

• a) an individual – by leaving a copy with him or her (typically done by process server)
• b) corporation – by leaving a copy with an important person in the corporation or by mailing it by registered mail to the company’s registered office;
• c) an infant- by leaving a copy with the infant’s guardian; and
• d) a mentally incompetent person – by leaving a copy with:
• the committee or with the person with whom he/she lives or who cares for him/her or with a person appointed by the court to be responsible for him/her; and
• the Public Guardian and Trustee.

2.  Unless the court otherwise orders, ordinary service of a document is effected by:

• a) leaving the document at the person’s address for service (if the address for service is a law office, by leaving the document at the law firm during business hours);
• b) by mailing the document to the person’s address for service;
• by faxing the document to the fax number for service, if any, including a fax cover sheet;
• or by emailing the document to an email address for service, if any.

TIME CALCULATIONS CHEAT SHEET FOR BC FAMILY LAW SERVICE AND TIME

The following is a mini “lesson” on time calculations in family law. This “cheat sheet” can serve as a helpful tool when representing yourself in a court action:

TIME CALCULATION CHEAT SHEET

COUNTING DAYS

1. When calculating time periods of 7 days or more, you must count holidays.

• Holidays = Sundays and statutory holidays – not Saturdays.
• Statutory holidays = New Year’s Day, Family Day, Good Friday, Easter Monday, Victoria Day, Canada Day, BC Day, Labour Day, Thanksgiving Day, Remembrance Day, Christmas Day, and Boxing Day.

2. When calculating time periods of less than 7 days, you don’t count holidays.

WHEN A DOCUMENT IS DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN SERVED

3. Personal or ordinary service of documents after 4:00 p.m. will be deemed to be personally or ordinarily served the next day that is not a Saturday or holiday (or the next day that the business is open).

COUNTING CLEAR DAYS AND REGULAR DAYS

4. When counting clear days, which can also be stated as “at least” or “not less than”, you do not count either the first or last day.

• For example, this is what 3 clear days from Wednesday, April 16 would look like:
• Hint: It helps to place circles on the calendar as you are counting to make sure you count correctly.

Sunday         Monday       Tuesday       Wednesday   Thursday     Friday        Saturday

5. When counting regular days, which can also be stated as “ordinary” days or “within” (not stated as clear days), you do not count the first day but you do count the last.

• For example, if you are served with a document on Monday, April 14 at 11:00 a.m. and must respond within 5 days, it would look like this:

Sunday         Monday       Tuesday       Wednesday   Thursday     Friday         Saturday

COUNTING CLEAR MONTHS AND REGULAR MONTHS

6. To calculate a certain number of clear months, calculate from a specific day in one month to the numerically corresponding day in the appropriate month plus one day. If the time period expires on the 29, 30, or 31 day of a month where there is no such date in that month, the time period expires on the last day of that month.

• For example, four clear months from March 12 is July 13.

7. To calculate a certain number of regular months (not stated as clear months), calculate from a specific day in one month to the numerically corresponding day in the appropriate month. If the time period expires on the 29, 30, or 31 day of a month where there is no such date in that month, the time period expires on the last day of that month.

• For example, four regular months from March 12 is July 12.

STATUTORY HOLIDAYS “IN LIEU”

8. Remember that if a statutory holiday falls on a weekend, businesses will be closed on the following Monday in lieu of the statutory holiday.

• For example, if Christmas and Boxing Day fall on a weekend and a deadline to do something was supposed to “land” on Monday the 27 or Tuesday the 28 (counting forwards), you would have to move the deadline forward to Wednesday the 29 as businesses would be closed on Monday and Tuesday in lieu of Christmas and Boxing Day.

• Similarly, if you were trying to calculate the deadline to give notice of something happening in the future and the deadline was supposed to “land” on Monday the 27 or Tuesday the 28 (counting backwards), you would have to move the notice deadline back to Friday, December 24.

SERVICE OF A DOCUMENT VIA MAIL

9. If a document is served on a party via mail, service is effective on the same day in the following calendar week – if that day is a Saturday or holiday, then the next day that is not a Saturday or holiday.

SERVICE OF A DOCUMENT VIA FAX OR EMAIL

1. Service via fax or email is effective on the same day if faxed or emailed before 4:00 p.m., or on the next day that is not a Saturday or statutory holiday if faxed or emailed after 4:00 p.m.

• If a fax is 30 pages or more (including the cover page), without prior agreement, it can be faxed only between 5:00 p.m. and 8:00 a.m.

LIMITATION ACT – TWO-YEAR LIMITATION PERIOD

1. When calculating a two year limitation period, you need to subtract a day.

• For example, the limitation date for an event that occurred on January 8, 2013, is January 7, 2015.

* Please be sure to routinely check the Practice Directions or Administrative Notices that

come down from the courts as they may compliment or revise the procedures outlined

above.

 As a self-represented litigant, it is crucial that you educate yourself in the rules of the court. It will not only save you time and money, but also shows the court your respect for its procedures and allows you to concentrate on the important aspects of your family law case.

BC family law service and time rules are tricky and a failure to follow them strictly can lead to disaster. Meet with our experienced family law lawyers today at any of our four offices across BC.

Romney Burkett

Legal Assistant/Paralegal Student

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Settlements in BC family law cases are common and are the focus of our MacLean Family Law legal team. Since 97 percent of family law cases settle outside of court, clear offers to settle are important in ending  often acrimonious family law disputes. But what is the test when an offer to settle is made and each side of the BC family law dispute has a different view of what the terms of the BC family settlement offer mean? Will a court enforce a settlement when each side to the family law dispute has differing ideas of what the offer really means? When will a family law settlement offer be enforced when there is dispute over whether a settlement was even reached?

Lorne MacLean, Q.C. Family Law Settlements Appeal Lawyer

Lorne MacLean, QC together with associate Johanna Stein of MacLean Law were recently retained to appeal an order that enforced a family law settlement which was not what the wife and her counsel had intended. The MacLean law lawyers successfully persuaded the BC Court of Appeal that the parties were never actually “on the same page” when an offer made by the wife’s counsel was purportedly accepted by counsel for the husband.  The husband and his lawyer had also tried to graft another term onto the settlement which would have led to an unfair result. This decision sets critical guidelines for when BC family law settlements will or will not be enforced and it also advances the law in BC for all family law practitioners and their clients.

Here is the official snapshot of our win on the BC family settlement for our delighted client as prepared by the BC Court of Appeal website:

Summary:

Appeal from an order staying family law proceedings on the basis that an enforceable settlement agreement had been reached. The appellant argued that the parties had not agreed on the issue of the division of family assets and there was no binding agreement. The chambers judge excluded the first two pages of the letter proposing the settlement as “campaign talk”, and found an “objectively reasonable” settlement in the terms set out on the third page only. Held: appeal allowed. There was no binding agreement. The parties had not agreed on the important issue of the division of assets. The chambers judge failed to consider all of the evidence of all of the material facts and to determine the entire scope of the settlement

MacLean Law’s Arguments Accepted By BC Court of Appeal

The BC Court of Appeal relied upon the cases MacLean and Stein provided to them and adopted the arguments raised by the team in their written fact as follows:

[26]         The first question to be considered on the appeal is whether there was a binding settlement agreement between the parties.

[27]         The principles to be applied in circumstances such as this case were discussed by this Court in Lacroix v. Loewen, 2010 BCCA 224. The issue in that case was whether a settlement of a claim for damages suffered in a motor vehicle accident included both a tort claim and a claim for benefits under Part 7 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Regulation, B.C. Reg. 447/83, under the Insurance (Vehicle) Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 231. The chambers judge held there was a settlement of the tort claim which ICBC repudiated by insisting the settlement included the Part 7 claims. This Court allowed the appeal, finding there was an enforceable settlement of both tort and Part 7 claims (at para. 38).

[28]         Chief Justice Finch, in his reasons for the Court, began his discussion of the principles of contract formation (at para. 35):

The principles of contract formation are set out in Fridman, The Law of Contract (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2006) at 15:

… the test of agreement for legal purposes is whether parties have indicated to the outside world, in the form of the objective reasonable bystander, their intention to contract and the terms of such contract.

The law is concerned not with the parties’ intentions but with their manifested intentions. It is not what an individual party believed or understood was the meaning of what the other party said or did that is the criterion of agreement; it is whether a reasonable man in the situation of that party would have believed and understood that the other party was consenting to the identical terms. …:

the parties will be found to have reached a meeting of the minds, in other words be ad idem, where it is clear to the objective reasonable bystander, in light of all the material facts, that the parties intended to contract and the essential terms of that contract can be determined with a reasonable degree of certainty.

[Italics emphasis in original.]

[29]         He explained further (at paras. 36-38):

[36]      The correct interpretation in such a case is to analyze the evidence to determine whether it is clear to the objective reasonable bystander, in light of all the material facts, that the parties intended to contract and whether the essential terms of that contract can be determined with a reasonable degree of certainty. Not only must there be an offer and acceptance, but the evidence must be capable of demonstrating that there is an agreement on all essential terms. In this case, a correct analysis would have led the judge to consider the evidence and determine whether it showed, objectively, that the parties intended a tort settlement, or a tort and Part 7 settlement, or whether the evidence was incapable of supporting either conclusion. To answer the first Fieguth question, the trial judge had to be able to determine the entire scope of the settlement….

….In interpreting a contract, what is relevant is the parties’ outward manifestations as to the scope of the whole settlement. That scope is to be assessed as a whole, on all of the material evidence, and not in individual pieces.

[Underline emphasis added.]

The Trial Judges’s Error In Not Looking At The Entire Proposal Letter

[30]         The chambers judge in this case made the same error as the judge in Lacroix. She expressly excluded the first two pages of the Proposal from her determination of the scope of the settlement, thus failing to analyze the evidence in light of all the material facts and to determine the entire scope of the settlement based on the evidence. As Finch C.J.B.C. said (at para. 37): “That scope is to be assessed as a whole, on all of the material evidence, and not in individual pieces.”

[31]         The evidence before the chambers judge included all three pages of the Proposal. On the second page, appellant’s counsel said “… the law is clear that the parties’ assets and debts should be divided equally”. She then listed the parties’ assets and noted specific assets that were excluded from the equal division and therefore would be kept by each of parties respectively. The chambers judge dismissed these statements as “campaign talk”, when on a consideration of all of the evidence, the division of the parties’ assets was a material aspect of the Proposal.

[32]         The chambers judge also failed to consider respondent’s counsel’s interpretation of the result of the settlement in the Response. Instead of merely accepting the settlement proposal in the terms set out on page three of the Proposal, he found it necessary to confirm that the effect of the settlement resulted “in each party retaining any other assets held or registered in their sole name or possession”. A comparison of this statement with the whole of the Proposal reveals the disjunction between the parties’ intentions. It is clearly stated on page two of the Proposal that “this proposal is based on” the parties keeping specific assets, not on “each party retaining any other assets held or registered in their sole name or possession”, as stated in the Response. Reading both the Proposal and the Response as a whole reveals that the respondent was not consenting to the identical terms proposed by the appellant.

[35]         As the Court said in Lacroix however, the question is whether a reasonable person in the respondent’s situation would have believed or understood that the appellant was consenting to the identical terms as the respondent understood them. That his counsel found it necessary in the Response to clarify its effect indicates that a reasonable person would not have concluded that the parties had reached a binding agreement which excluded the division of any of the parties’ assets.

[36]         I therefore conclude that the parties had not agreed on the issue of the division of assets, and there was no binding settlement agreement.

Result For Our Client

Importantly, as a result of the MacLean Law team’s efforts the purported BC family settlement was not enforced, legal costs that had been awarded against the wife were reversed and our delighted client received her legal costs from her husband at both the Court of Appeal and in the Supreme Court of BC.

If you have a family law  or BC family settlement case you want settled across BC call one of our experienced and compassionate family law lawyers to meet with us across BC at one of our 4 offices found in downtown Vancouver, Surrey, Kelowna and Fort St John. You can call us toll free to set up an initial consultation.  Meeting with an experienced lawyer is one of the most important steps a person considering separation should take. Failing to do so can be financially fatal. Call us now toll free 1-877-602-9900.

The post BC Family Settlement Appeal Success appeared first on MacLean Family Law.

The recent BC Supreme Court decision of S.B. v. S.M 2014 BCSC 2105 has reiterated what must be proved under either of the Divorce Act or BC Family Law Act in order for the court to change an earlier final child custody or child parenting order in British Columbia. In SB v SM, a change was allowed by the Court due to high conflict between both parents and allegations of parental alienation.  The court carefully addressed the important legal test for changing prior court orders. Child custody and parenting orders are never final but neither can they be easily changed.  The test to succeed on a variation of an earlier order is stringent to prevent multiple reappearances in court by disappointed parties to change Orders they are dissatisfied with. In simple terms, the first order is entitled to respect unless it can be shown facts are now present, which had  they existed at the time of the first order would have caused a different order to be made to protect a child’s best interests.

The court followed an earlier BC Court of Appeal order establishing the proper test for variation of BC child parenting orders:

A.     The Test for Variation of Custody and Guardianship

[100]     Neither party addressed the legal test for variation of a custody, guardianship or parenting order.

[101]     The original order by which custody and guardianship were established (the order of Gill J. of November 7, 2006) did not specify the statute that was to govern its provisions.  Fortunately, the test of “material change in circumstances” applies to applications to vary a final order for custody or support made pursuant to either the Divorce Act or the Family Relations Act: Boychuck v. Singleton, 2008 BCCA 355.

Post Separation Conflict Between Parents Harms A Child

As experienced family lawyers, we tell our client nothing harms the normal development of a child more than prolonged post separation conflict. We tell them to focus on loving their child more than they dislike their ex spouse and to not denigrate the other parent in the child’s presence. In most cases parents are able to cooperate for their child’s sake but in others action by the Courts will be needed:

[117]     I am satisfied that both parents are loving parents who, if parenting alone, would give their son a reasonable upbringing.  Economically the households are similar.  A.’s social and school ties are associated much more with the mother’s household and a change to S.M.’s home would disrupt these significantly.  Such a change would also disrupt A.’s relationship with his half-siblings.  These prospective disruptions weigh against the change sought by S.M.

[118]     The differing parenting styles of S.B. and S.M. — as well as, I strongly suspect, A.’s awareness of the conflict between his parents — are causing A. stress and anxiety.  Each parent suspects that the other parent is being openly critical of them in A.’s presence.  Dr. Posthuma found no evidence of any campaign by S.B. and T.B. to marginalize S.M. as a parent, instead finding more evidence of hostility by S.M. against S.B.  Again, he noted that A. was much more relaxed and natural in the home of S.B. and T.B.

[119]     Although S.M. said he felt he was less likely to prohibit access than S.B., and more likely to encourage A.’s relationship with her, from the evidence as a whole I consider the opposite is true.

[120]     This brings me to the s. 15 report itself.  Dr. Elterman was critical of Dr. Posthuma’s methodology.  I found that Dr. Posthuma answered some of these criticisms satisfactorily.  While there may be some force in Dr. Elterman’s comment that Dr. Posthuma seems to have arrived at a conclusion and then looked for evidence to back it up, it seems plain from the evidence at trial that the conflict between the parties is a substantial cause of A.’s difficulties, as Dr. Posthuma concluded.

The court varied the original order to put one parent in charge and to set exact times for child contact with the other parent as well as orders for counselling for the child.

If you seek a variation of BC child parenting orders and want a lawyer with decades of experience to help you you can feel confident in retaining the lawyers at MacLean Law.

Contact MacLean Law To Move Forward Successfully

If you have a difficult child custody or parenting case, or if you just want guidance on how to put a plan in place that becomes a win win parenting plan for the child and both parents then call us now to meet with us at any of our 4 offices across BC located in Fort St John, Surrey, Kelowna and Vancouver BC. 1-877-602-9900.

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Have New Rules for BC Child Relocation And Substantially Equal Parenting Time Caused More Conflict?

Have BC’s new child relocation rules setting different standards for success -depending on time spent by both parents with a child- created more fighting over how much time each parent spends with their child post separation? Will more separating parents seek shared custody to hedge their bets on child move away plans? Will a parent with a “child move away” agenda reduce time by their child to the non primary residential parent to increase their chances of child relocation success? Are the new BC substantially equal parenting relocation rules helping or hurting children in BC?

Relocation Is Common In Today’s Modern World

Vancouver Custody Guardianship and Child Relocation Lawyer, Lorne MacLean, Q.C.

Bc child relocation is an increasingly common event in children’s lives after their parents separate or divorce. Separated BC spouses enter new relationships, get job offers or wish to return to their roots where family and relatives live.  Child relocation and move away disputes are often the most difficult of family disputes to resolve and  these disputes often end up in court. The reason is because of the huge change the relocation causes to a child’s ability to spend maximum time with both parents. Our skilled MacLean Law lawyers handle these cases on a daily basis and we are pleased to provide a comprehensive strategy that promotes your child’s best interests.

New BC Rules For Moving Away With A Child Now Apply

Our Bc Family Law Act  has established new rules for what test is applied when one parent wishes to move to another city, province or country with the child. Our act establishes a lower threshold for allowing a move if the parent’s haven’t spend substantially equal time with a child prior to the move and a higher threshold to succeed if both parents have shared substantially equal time. Just as the child support guidelines 40 percent rule for potentially departing from the normal child support payment has lead to disputes and battles over the time a child spends with each parent so too does the relocation rule regarding substantially equal time. A parent with a move away agenda may attempt to reduce the time the child parent spends with the child and vice versa

The government explanation for Division 6 of our Family Law Act explains:

• It deals with situations in which the guardians of a child do not have substantially equal parenting time. The moving guardian, who has the majority of the time with and care of the child, must show “good faith” reasons for the move and must provide reasonable and workable alternate parenting arrangements that will maintain the relationship between the child and other guardian. If the court is satisfied that those two things are established then there is a presumption in favour of the move, unless the objecting guardian satisfies the court that the move is not in the best interests of the child.

• The section also deals with situations in which the guardians have substantially equal parenting time. In such a case, both parents play a significant role in the child’s day-to- day life and it may be difficult to maintain this relationship if there were a move. Therefore, the threshold is higher and the moving guardian has full responsibility for satisfying the court that the proposal to move is made in “good faith,” reasonable and workable alternate parenting arrangements have been proposed, and the move is in the best interests of the child.

Issue 2    Did the parties exercise “substantially equal parenting time” with P. at the time of the proposed relocation?

[35]         E.M. argues that D.M. has not exercised substantially equal parenting time in the last year and a half, and indeed that he has never exercised equal parenting time. She also says the term of the Divorce Order which provides for equal parenting time is not relevant to this consideration. Rather, she says I must consider what has actually happened, particularly in the most recent time period before the notice of relocation. [36]         I reject E.M.’s argument on two bases. First, I conclude the term in the Divorce Order is relevant. The parties agreed to equal parenting time. They worked in a relatively cooperative fashion to share parenting time. They did not fight over particulars of the parenting time until disputes arose in the last few months. They each tried to accommodate the other. While I conclude that E.M. did have more parenting time, I find the parties entered into a practical arrangement which they believed was putting into effect the terms of the Divorce Order and would be in the best interests of P. It would not be fair to take D.M.’s acquiescence to the practical arrangements, which were dictated by E.M., as an indication he was somehow releasing his agreed right to equal parenting time. [37]         Second, I conclude the parties were in fact exercising substantially equal parenting time. That term does not appear to have been judicially considered. I accept E.M.’s statement that at all times D.M. exercised at least 35% parenting time, and some of the time as much as 45% of the parenting time. I also note that since the possible relocation was first raised, he has exercised equal parenting time, given the steps taken by his counsel. [38]         As I have concluded the term of the Divorce Order providing for equal parenting is relevant to this issue, I need not carefully examine the precise amount of parenting time each party has exercised. However, I must still be satisfied the parties have not entirely ignored the Divorce Order and that there has been substantial equality to parenting time. I conclude that they have exercised substantially equal parenting time. I base this conclusion on the fact that D.M. has, throughout their time since separation, exercised in the range of 40% of parenting time. The 40% figure, as set out in s. 9 of the Child Support Guidelines, is a useful guide for relocation purposes. The fact the 40% figure is used as the cut‑off of equal parenting for child support purposes is of significance. If that figure is considered a threshold figure for support purposes, it should also be used as a guideline for s. 69(4) purposes. While I am of the view that 40% is a good guide to what is substantially equal parenting time, I am also of the view it should not be approached as a cut‑off figure in relation to relocation applications. Rather, it is a rough guide as to the lower end of the range for equal parenting. [39]         In summary, I find that D.M. has exercised substantially equal parenting time. Accordingly, the presumption in s. 69(4) is not relevant to the analysis I must undertake in evaluating the proposed relocation.

BC’s substantially equal parenting relocation rules can be complex and confusing.  Our experienced child mobility and child relocation lawyers are pleased to sit down with you to help craft a parenting time plan that addresses any current or future plans by you or your ex spouse.

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Cancelling BC Support Arrears Means Proving Not To Do So Would Be Grossly Unfair

Lorne MacLean, QC, BC support arrears cancellation lawyer

Cancelling BC support arrears requires the paying spouse who is behind on their payments to meet a very compelling onus to succeed. Unless the paying spouse shows it would be grossly unfair not to cancel the arrears the application to cancel or reduce arrears will fail.

Two 2014 BC Supreme court cases have reiterated the heavy onus faced by paying spouses to cancel arrears of support that have built up as a result of non- payment of court ordered support.  In Holmstrom v. Holmstrom found at 2014 BCSC 545, which case’s analysis was followed in BF v JF 2014 BCSC 1892 two BC Supreme Court Justices refused to cancel arrears relying on the following principles (high-lighted for the good parts):

[38]         In Earle v. Earle, 1999 BCSC 283 at paras. 25-43, Madam Justice Martinson clarified the criteria for a cancellation or reduction of arrears. In relation to a change in financial circumstances, she said: [25]      I will now consider a number of specific arguments that are often made to the courts on applications to cancel or reduce arrears and give the legal rules that apply to those arguments.

1. “I cannot afford to pay now”

[26]      Not being able to pay now is not a valid legal reason to cancel or reduce arrears. They will only be cancelled if the person is unable to pay now and will be unable to pay in the future.

1. “I could not pay when I was supposed to because my financial circumstances changed”

[27]      People making this argument have a heavy onus. It is not good enough just to say that they could not pay because they earned less. They can only get a reduction or a cancellation of arrears if they present detailed and full financial disclosure, under oath (usually in the form of an affidavit) that:

1. the change was significant and long lasting and
2. the change was real and not one of choice and

iii.         every effort was made to earn money (or more money) during the time in question, and those efforts were not successful.

[Emphasis in original.]

Theses two recent decisions also cited with approval at 2012 decision that explained the reasoning behind having such a difficult test for cancelling arrears. One of them is discourage disgruntled payers from refusing to work or slacking off with the hopes of changing an order they are disappointed with.

[39]         In L.B. v. J.K., 2012 BCPC 231, Hamilton P.C.J. outlined some of the principles to consider in determining the meaning of “grossly unfair”: [50]      What is clear from these cases is that a determination of gross unfairness is a factual determination. As well, it is clear that the gross unfairness test applies to applications to reduce or cancel arrears of both child and spousal maintenance. [51]      So, what does “grossly unfair” mean? [52]      I was unable to find any helpful authority that sets out what the phrase “grossly unfair” means. Obviously to meet the grossly unfair test the applicant must establish more than it would be unfair to maintain the maintenance arrears. Establishing gross unfair is clearly a more onerous test that proving simple unfairness. [53]      I am of the view that gross unfairness means more than something that is a significant financial burden.

[54]      In order to meet the gross unfairness test, I am of the opinion that the applicant must establish that maintaining the maintenance arrears is so unfair that to enforce payment of the arrears would serve an injustice on the payor that the court cannot countenance. If enforcing payment of the arrears leaves a payor in strained financial circumstances, that is not enough.

[55]      Circumstances in which a court might conclude that an applicant has met the gross unfairness test might include situations where child maintenance arrears have accumulated during a time when the child was living with the payor and not the recipient, or where the child was removed from the recipient’s care by child welfare authorities, or was living with other extended family members. Gross unfairness might be established in circumstances where enforcing the payment of the maintenance arrears would force the payor into bankruptcy. A determination of gross unfairness in these examples would depend on the facts of each individual case. However, what is clear from the authorities is that cases in which maintenance arrears will be reduced or cancelled are rare: see [Luney v. Luney, 2007 BCCA 567] at para. 43. [56]      There is a reason for the test being as onerous as it is. The test is onerous because parents have a duty to their children to financially support those children throughout their childhood. This duty imposes an obligation on both parents to financially support their children commensurate with the parents’ financial circumstances – Earle, supra, at para. 16. This duty exists whether or not a court order is in place. [57]      When a parent fails to fulfil their duty, the children are deprived of the financial support they are entitled to receive, but which they cannot enforce. The children cannot go to court to secure the payment of the support they are due. The children suffer a deprivation, an injustice. [58]      When the parent’s duty is secured by a court order, the failure to fulfil that duty not only serves an injustice to the child, but the parent is disobeying a court order. Our courts cannot, and will not, tolerate such conduct except in the rarest of cases. [59]      So, when a parent comes to court having failed in their duty to their child, deprived the child of that which the child is entitled to receive but cannot enforce, and disobeyed a court order, our courts will not condone that parent’s behaviour unless, and only unless, to insist that the parent fulfil his or her duty would be grossly unfair. For these reasons, the grossly unfair test is not an easy test to meet.

If you have a spousal or child support arrears problem that you requires legal advice from an experienced family lawyer, meet with us across BC at one of our offices in Fort St John, Kelowna, Surrey and Vancouver. Cancelling BC support arrears is thorny issue and the stakes are high. Call us today.

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How do parents trapped in family law disputes related to their children get help to break free from their BC parenting time and child custody “gordion knot”?  MacLean Law has experienced parenting coordinators, arbitrators and mediators who can help you resolve your family matters in Fort St John and Dawson Creek, Kelowna, Vancouver and Surrey BC. Our BC parenting coordinators work with you to reach consensus and if necessary will determine disputed issues.

BC parenting coordinators at MacLean Law help you move forward on a child focused basis

This week’s BC parenting coordinators appointment decision ordered the appointment of a parent coordinator to help two parents locked in a high conflict parenting dispute move forward.  In JC v. KC  Mr. Justice Armstrong discussed the current state of the law related to the appointment of  the BC parenting coordinators as follows:

[317]     The authority to appoint a parenting coordinator flows from s. 15 of the FLA:

15(1)    In this Division, “parenting coordination agreement or order” means a written agreement or an order to use a parenting coordinator.

(2)        A parenting coordinator may assist only

(a)        if there is a parenting coordination agreement or order in place, and

(b)        for the purpose of implementing an agreement or order respecting parenting arrangements, contact with a child or other prescribed matters.

(3)        A parenting coordination agreement or order may be made at the same time as, or after, an agreement or order respecting parenting arrangements, contact with a child or other prescribed matters is made.

(4)        A parenting coordinator’s authority to act ends 2 years after the parenting coordination agreement or order is made, unless the parenting coordination agreement or order specifies that the parenting coordinator’s authority is to end on an earlier date or on the occurrence of an earlier event.

(5)        Despite subsection (4), a parenting coordination agreement or order may be extended by a further parenting coordination agreement or order, but each extension may be for no more than 2 years.

(6)        Despite subsection (4), a parenting coordination agreement or order may be terminated at any time as follows:

(a)        in the case of an agreement, by agreement of the parties or by an order made on application by either of the parties;

(b)        in the case of an order, by an order made on application by either of the parties;

(c)        in any case, by the parenting coordinator, on giving notice to the parties and, if the parenting coordinator is acting under an order, to the court.

[318]     With regards to the appointment of parenting coordinators, the observations of the Court in D.C. v. B.C., 2013 BCSC 915 [D.C.] at para. 58 are apposite to this case:

As a part of this order I appoint a parenting coordinator. I so do because this is a case in which there is a history of conflict, animosity and delayed responsiveness on B.C.’s part in necessary decision-making in important matters regarding D. I do not accept that, as B.C. submits, this pattern is likely to change quickly or dramatically once the litigation has concluded. When the inevitable conflicts continue to erupt, however, a parenting coordinator may well be the most effective and inexpensive means by which they can be resolved in D’s best interests.

[319]     In Silverman v. Silverman, 2013 BCSC 601 [Silverman], the Court said at para. 22:

I do appreciate that a parenting coordinator costs money, but I cannot believe that such a service could possibly cost more than the parties have seen fit to spend on battling in court. Indeed, I would expect a significant saving. If they can manage to be sensible and reach agreements in the best interests of their children without requiring the services, then the expense will be minimal. But most importantly, I am satisfied that the intervention of a parenting coordinator is essential to the children’s welfare. It follows that the parents will just have to reprioritize their expenses. As will be seen, they are not entirely without financial resources.

[320]     In order to ensure that the parties change their relationship, I believe it is important that they have assistance in the services of a parenting coordinator pursuant to s. 15 of the FLA. I am guided by the observations of the Court in D.C. and in Silverman, and I accept that the history of conflict, animosity, and communication difficulties in this case will not resolve easily. It is in the best interests of the children to have a parenting coordinator.

[321]     Parenting coordinators may be costly but the parties should be able to minimize these charges if they can adopt a more measured response to concerns of the other spouse.

Parenting coordinators can help bridge communication issues and help parents gain a fresh perspective on how to end longstanding disputes over raising their children after separation.  If you are involved in a case where you want a legal opinion or advice concerning whether a BC parenting coordinator can help you and your spouse call us across BC toll free at 1-877-602-9900.

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Supervised Child Parenting Contact and Supervised Access

As a young lawyer, Lorne MacLean QC successfully acted for the mother in the Supreme Court of Canada case of Young v. Young, which became and remains the leading authority on how to properly decide child custody and child access disputes. The court determined that the test for discussing access is the best interests of the child and the endorsed the principle of maximum contact so long as it was in a child’s – not a parent’s – best interests. The focus is on parental responsibilities not rights. When a court has saftey concerns it can order supervised child parenting contact and access. When is this appropriate?

Maximum Contact To Parents As Is In Child’s Best Interests

The Supreme Court of Canada in Young v Young [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3 acknowledged that it is in the best interest of the child to consider both the child’s and parenting capacity perspectives in deciding custody and access arrangements.

[143] In making a determination as to the best interests of the child, courts must attempt to balance such considerations as the age, physical and emotional constitution and psychology of both the child and his or her parents and the particular milieu in which the child will live.

However, when it comes to situations where a parent’s demeanour and actions show poor judgment, deficient parenting capacity or are inexcusably unscrupulous and concerning, the court may have no choice but to order supervised child access also called supervised child contact.

Rules For When Supervision Is Appropriate

Julia Tchezganova, Vancouver family associate

In the F.K. v. M.K. 2012 BCSC 563,  the Plaintiff father was seeking sole custody of the child. Yet his actions, words, and general disrespectful behaviour led to the court giving sole custody to the mother and ordering supervised access even though he had unsupervised access before.

In paragraph 147, the court relied on V.S.J. v. L.J.G., outlining the factors that are commonly considered in courts in terminating access:

1. Long term harassment and harmful behaviours towards the custodial parent

causing that parent and the child stress and or fear.

2. History of violence; unpredictable, uncontrollable behaviour; alcohol, drug

abuse which has been witnessed by the child and/or presents a risk to the child’s safety and well-being.

3. Extreme parental alienation which has resulted in changes of custody and, at

times, no access orders to the former custodial parent.

4. Ongoing severe denigration of the other parent.
5. Lack of relationship or attachment between noncustodial parent and child.
6. Neglect or abuse to a child on the access visits.
7. Older children’s wishes and preferences to terminate access.

In the decision, the court confirms that while it is important for a parent to have access, the safety and security of the child are of utmost importance.

[154]     What the plaintiff also failed to understand is that his visible disrespect—one could say visible hatred—for the defendant and her family, will be harmful to the child’s emotional development.  The child needs to grow up respecting both parents and their families.

Remember these cases require experienced counsel when parents cannot agree on what is in the best interests of their children. Contact us if you have concerns over the mental or physical saftey of yourself or a child.

Julia Tchezganova – Vancouver MacLean Law associate

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Did you know that since March of 2013 BC Common law marriage like relationships of greater than 2 years give common law spouses in BC the same family property division rights as married couples? The new regime shares most property equally that is acquired during these BC common law marriage like relationships. The starting value of  the Property brought into the common law or marriage like relationship is generally not shareable but the gain is. Normally, any gain is shared equally but the court has the power to unequally divide even the gain made during the relationship.

Lorne MacLean QC Bc common law marriage like relationships lawyer

People often argue over whether they were in a marriage like relationship when the property division stakes become so high as unlike a marriage there may often be no clear starting date for the couple’s relationship. Our highly experienced family law department has offices across BC in Fort St John, Surrey, Kelowna and downtown Vancouver and you can call us toll free at 1-877-602-9900. Watch this video by Lorne MacLean, QC to learn more about whether you are in or out of a common-law relationship.

In The BC Supreme Court case of Williams v. Killey the court dealt with the determination of whether or not the couple was in a marriage like relationship and then unequally divided the family property in favour of the husband.

[1]             This is a claim arising out of a three-and-one-half year relationship of living together which the claimant alleges constituted a common-law relationship entitling her to remedies under the Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c. 25, (“the FLA”) while the respondent denies that it constituted a common law relationship of at least two years.

Analysis and decision

[40]         The major issue in this case is whether the parties were in a common law relationship for a period of at least two years prior to separation. [41]         Claimant’s counsel relies upon the judgment of Madam Justice Huddart in Takacs and Boucher v. Gallo (1998), 157 D.L.R. (4^th) 623 where she adopted the seven part test of “spouse” set out in Molodowich v. Penttinen (1980), 17 R.F.L. (2d) 376 (Ont. Dist. Ct.) [42]         However, I observe that on this issue Madam Justice Huddart was in dissent as Madam Justice Newbury, with Chief Justice McEachern concurring, said she read the comments of Lambert J.A. in Gostlin v. Kergin (1986), 3 B.C.L.R. (2d) 264, differently than had Madam Justice Huddart. [43]         In her judgment, Madam Justice Huddart said as follows:

The test developed by Mr. Justice Lambert in Gostlin has two aspects. The first is the couple’s subjective intention. At 267-68, he commented:

So I would ask whether the unmarried couple’s relationship was like the relationship of the married couple in that the unmarried couple have shown that they have voluntarily embraced the permanent support obligations of s. 57. If each partner had been asked, at any time during the relevant period of more than two years, whether, if their partner were to be suddenly disabled for life, would they consider themselves committed to life-long financial and moral support of that partner, and the answer of both of them would have been “Yes”, then they are living together as husband and wife. If the answer would have been “No”, then they may be living together, but not as husband and wife.

The second is an objective test, set out at 268:

Of course, in the particular circumstances of any case, the answer to that question may prove elusive. If that is so, then other, more objective indicators may show the way. Did the couple refer to themselves, when talking to their friends, as husband and wife, or as spouses, or in some equivalent way that recognized a long-term commitment? Did they share the legal rights to their living accommodation? Did they share their property? Did they share their finances and their bank accounts? Did they share their vacations? In short, did they share their lives? And, perhaps most important of all, did one of them surrender financial independence and become economically dependent on the other, in accordance with a mutual arrangement?

…

[44]         On this issue, Madam Justice Newbury said as follows:

The starting point in this province for the analysis required in cases of this kind is the judgment of this court in Gostlin v. Kergin (1986) 3 B.C.L.R. (2d) 264, and in particular, the comments of Lambert J.A. at 267-8 which are quoted in Madam Justice Huddart’s judgment. I read those comments as focussing first on the intentions of the parties to live “as husband and wife”, or in a marriage-like relationship. Such an intention may or may not include financial dependence. The various “objective indicators” referred to in Gostlin were advanced as a means of divining those subjective intentions where the latter “prove elusive”. By the same token, of course, subjective or conscious intentions may be overtaken by conduct such that whilst a person living with another might not say he or she was living in a marriage-like relationship, the reality is that the relationship has become such. (para. 53)

Madam Justice Huddart analyzes Fitton as departing somewhat from Gostlin and as exemplifying the fact that financial intertwining and dependency between a couple may be sufficient to lead to the inference that the relationship is marriage-like “even in circumstances where neither party intended a lifetime commitment.” With respect, I do not think Fitton fairly bears that interpretation, nor that the Court intended to depart from Gostlin and its recognition that persons living together should not be forced into mutual commitments they do not want or intend. Braidwood J.A. referred at several points in his judgment in Fitton to the parties’ intentions and indeed his conclusion on the first branch of the statutory definition was that they had “intended throughout the relevant period to live together as husband and wife”. He then turned to the second question arising under the Yukon statute, namely whether the appellant had been dependent upon the deceased for maintenance and support. He found the trial judge had erred in the test he applied on this branch. That test had been expressed by the trial judge as follows:

But it is certain in this case that the plaintiff did not depend upon the deceased for her living expenses at any time. I am quite sure that if either the plaintiff or the deceased, when he was alive, had been asked whether one would look after the other in ill health or other change in circumstances, the answer would have been “No.” [at para. 32]

The Court in Fitton was of the opinion that dependence does not require an applicant to prove that “without the support of her partner during the period of cohabitation she would have been seriously deprived or even destitute.” [at para. 37] (para. 54)

In both Gostlin and Fitton, the question of whether persons were living together as spouses notwithstanding that they were not legally married involved the court in an examination of their intentions and not simply an objective assessment of whether their financial and living arrangements were “intertwined”. If the Legislature had intended the latter, it would have been an easy matter to so state. Objective factors will of course be relevant to determine the parties’ intentions as Lambert J.A. noted in Gostlin but those factors will rarely be determinative in and of themselves. Many combinations of people may live together and meet many of the criteria set forth in Molodowich v. Penttinen (1980) 17 R.F.L. (2d) 376 (Ont. Dist. Ct.), but without intending or in fact entering the kind of psychological and emotional union that one associates with marriage. (para. 55)

[45]         In addition in Austin v. Goerz, 2007 BCCA 586, Frankel J.A. stated at para. 58:

It is understandable that the presence or absence of any particular factor cannot be determinative of whether a relationship is marriage-like. This is because equally there is no checklist of characteristics that will invariably be found in all marriages. …

[46]         He went on to quote from Yakiwchuk v. Oaks, 2003 SKQB 124:

[10] Spousal relationships are many and varied. Individuals in spousal relationships, whether they are married or not, structure their relationships differently. In some relationships there is a complete blending of finances and property – in others, spouses keep their property and finances totally separate and in still others one spouse may totally control those aspects of the relationship with the other spouse having little or no knowledge or input. For some couples, sexual relations are very important – for others, that aspect may take a back seat to companionship. Some spouses do not share the same bed. There may be a variety of reasons for this such as health or personal choice. Some people are affectionate and demonstrative. They show their feelings for their “spouse” by holding hands, touching and kissing in public. Other individuals are not demonstrative and do not engage in public displays of affection. Some “spouses” do everything together – others do nothing together. Some “spouses” vacation together and some spend their holidays apart. Some “spouses” have children – others do not. It is this variation in the way human beings structure their relationships that make the determination of when a “spousal relationship” exists difficult to determine. With married couples, the relationship is easy to establish. The marriage ceremony is a public declaration of their commitment and intent. Relationships outside marriage are much more difficult to ascertain. Rarely is there any type of “public” declaration of intent. Often people begin cohabiting with little forethought or planning. Their motivation is often nothing more than wanting to “be together”. Some individuals have chosen to enter relationships outside marriage because they did not want the legal obligations imposed by that status. Some individuals have simply given no thought as to how their relationship would operate. Often the date when the cohabitation actually began is blurred because people “ease into” situations, spending more and more time together. Agreements between people verifying when their relationship began and how it will operate often do not exist.

I consider their marriage like relationship began soon after the claimant moved into his townhome on June 1, 2009 and they commenced a continuous common law relationship thereafter of approximately three and one-half years prior to separation on November 1, 2012.

The court went on to unequally divide the gain on the excluded property brought into the relationship. This approach is considered controversial given that at law the excluded properties’ value was already kept entirely by the husband.

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Christmas can be a time of great emotions both positive and negative. Sadly, over the holidays our Vancouver family protection order lawyers see a rise in people who overindulge and who act out inappropriately, become threatening either verbally or physically, or worse yet assault or harm a spouse or family member. These ugly incidents often tear a family apart and the actions and consequences are often impossible to forget. Ideally, these volatile people get help before they degenerate into such negative behaviours. Yet, often these people cannot be trusted to act safely towards their loved ones.   When there is any risk that they will act out we recommend that the potential victims take action to protect themselves and their loved ones in advance of any hostile or dangerous action. Contact us immediately if you fear there is any possibility of risk.

Vancouver Family Protection Orders save families from violence and terrible memories that are hard to forget

Whether or not you choose to believe it, domestic violence is incredibly, incredibly common.

Here are some Canadian statistics:

• In 2006, 12% of all criminal prosecutions in BC were domestic violence cases;
• Only 28% of victims of spousal violence will actually report these incidents to police;
• 30 to 40% of children who witness abuse on their mother will also experience physical abuse;
• Of those children who were physically or sexually assaulted by someone, in 60% of the cases, the parents were the abusers; and
• 1/3 of all reported violent incidents committed against elderly adults were committed by a family member.

Clearly, for many, many individuals, those people who are supposed to be their best friends are their worst enemies…

I have seen many people who are victims of family violence and, it is awful. Some people are so incredibly scared that they burst out in tears at the thought of being with their abusive partner; AND, at the same time, they burst out in tears at the thought of being without their abusive partner.

So, if you are one of these people who desperately need protection, what should do you?

Well, first and foremost, you should call police. Police are of course, there to protect us, right? And, if you feel any threat to your safety, then absolutely call police.

Often, though, women (or men) who call police (initially) are not cooperative with police after they attend. As a result, criminal convictions against the abusers are often difficult to get.

Consider this: if the primary and only witness in a domestic violence case does not want to give evidence (against the abuser) in the trial, how can there be a trial? How can the Crown Prosecutor get a conviction against the abuser?

Now, what else can someone do other than call police?

Well, for one thing, they can apply to court and get a vancouver family protection order. On television, these are common referred to as ‘restraining orders’.

In order to get a vancouver family protection order, you need to go to court and convince a judge of two things:

• You are a family member of the abuser, which includes a child, parent, or spouse or ex-spouse/partner (of the abuser); and
• There is a risk that you will be hurt.

If you can convince a judge of these two things, then you will get a protection order.

Convincing a judge that you are a family member is usually very easy: it is typically as simple as explaining that you are the ex-spouse, child, or parent of the abuser.

The next step, though, isn’t quite as easy…

In order to convince a judge that you will be hurt, you need to describe the recent threatening conduct of the abuser. This includes past police incidents, past incidents of abuse, and past stalking behavior. Be prepared to describe the dates and events of abuse for the judge.

I can hear you thinking, “So what? What good is a Vancouver family protection order?”

Well, the answer is that it is an incredibly powerful document that can be shown to police if the abuser violates the order in anyway. In fact, it is a crime to violate a protection order.

Imagine this: you get a protection order against your former spouse, which says that he/she cannot have any direct or indirect contact with you. Now, let’s say that your ex-spouse sends you multiple Facebook messages.

Without the order, what would you do? Would you call police and tell them that you are getting Facebook messages?

How likely is it that the police will be able to do much against this person? After all, they aren’t committing a crime, right? They are just sending Facebook messages…

But, with a protection order, your ex-spouse IS committing a crime and the police have some ‘teeth’ to speak to the abuser and do whatever else they deem fit to ensure that your ex-spouse leaves you alone.

Here’s the bottom-line: if you are being abused, contact your police department, your local YWCA, a women’s shelter, or any other service that you choose.

You don’t have to live with abuse and there are services and people waiting to help you. There are also people who can help the person who is not in their right mind and who needs help to deal with their anger and other behavioural and psycholigical issues. It makes sense to act before things go sideways for all family members.

I’m Jeff Zilkowsky of MacLean Law and you can reach me or any of our experienced family lawyers across BC by calling us toll free at 1-877-602-9900.

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Relocation and Spending Time With Your Child

How does substantially equal parenting time relocation work? The rules for moving away with your child differ depending on whether you have substantially equal parenting time with your child after separation or less frequent child contact.

In Canada, the overriding rule for parenting time of separated parents with their children is that children should have maximum contact with both parents. This means that the child should have as much contact with each parent to the extent that it is consistent with the child’s best interest to do so. However, if both parents have substantially equal parenting time but one parent wishes to relocate to another city, province, or country, conflict often arises over whether the relocating parent should be allowed to bring the child with them, or if the child should remain in with the parent who stays in currently residing area. Under the new Family Law Act, new rules have emerged and precedents are emerging from the courts as to how to apply these rules.

Fanda Wu MacLean Law Child Relocation lawyer

New BC Supreme Court Case sets out test for relocation when parents have substantially equal parenting time

In R. C. v. R. E. H., 2014 BCSC 2348, the mother of five-year old L.H. wished to move to Williams Lake, BC with her new partner, and bring L.H. with her. The child’s current home was in Surrey, where the parties both lived, and the child had approximately equal time with both her mother, R. C., and her birth father, R. E. H. However, the move to Williams Lake would reduce time spent with the birth father from approximately 50% to 25%.

The court decided on whether to allow the relocation under the new Family Law Act (FLA), which replaces the previous test under the Family Relations Act:

Factors in Test set out under s. 69 of the FLA

If the parties share substantially equal parenting time with the child, the test for relocation under s. 69 of the FLA is:

1. the proposed relocation is made in good faith;
2. she has proposed reasonable and workable arrangements to preserve the relationship between the children and the other parent and other persons who have a significant role in the children’s lives; and,
3. The relocation is in the child’s best interests.

(a) the child’s health and emotional well-being;

(b) the child’s views, unless it would be inappropriate to consider them;

(c) the nature and strength of the relationships between the child and significant persons in the child’s life;

(d) the history of the child’s care;

(e) the child’s need for stability, given the child’s age and stage of development;

(f) the ability of each person who is a guardian or seeks guardianship of the child, or who has or seeks parental responsibilities, parenting time or contact with the child, to exercise his or her responsibilities;

(g) the impact of any family violence on the child’s safety, security or well-being, whether the family violence is directed toward the child or another family member;

(h) whether the actions of a person responsible for family violence indicate that the person may be impaired in his or her ability to care for the child and meet the child’s needs;

(i) the appropriateness of an arrangement that would require the child’s guardians to cooperate on issues affecting the child, including whether requiring cooperation would increase any risks to the safety, security or well-being of the child or other family members;

(j) any civil or criminal proceeding relevant to the child’s safety, security or well-being.

(a) the reasons for the proposed relocation;

(b) whether the proposed relocation is likely to enhance the general quality of life of the child and, if applicable, of the relocating guardian, including increasing emotional well-being or financial or educational opportunities;

(c) whether notice was given under section 66 [notice of relocation];

(d) any restrictions on relocation contained in a written agreement or an order.

The Best Interests of the Child

The court in R.C. heard expert evidence on both parents’ ability to parent and the child’s development and best interests, including the following:

The child’s views

The nature and strength of the relationships between the child and significant persons in the child’s life

The History of the child’s care

The Court’s Decision in R.C.

The court made a key finding that geographical distance reduces a parents’ contact with their child which inhibits a child’s attachment to that parent:

In closing, the court decided that the relocation was not made in good faith and also not in the child’s best interests, and thus declined to make an order for relocation. The move to Williams Lake would result in a great distance between the child and her birth father, which would cause strain and distancing in the young child’s relationship with her birth father. The mother’s reasons for moving to Williams Lake for greater financial security and to improve her and L.H.’s quality of life were also tenuous at best. It was decided that L.H. was too young to be separated from her birth father for such lengthy periods of time and geographical distance, and it would be best to maintain the current regime, at least until the child was a bit older.

The many factors the court must consider in determining whether to allow a parent to relocate with their child makes each case unique and complex. If you are considering a move or your ex-spouse is considering move, call us today for a consultation at 1-877-602-9900. Substantially equal parenting time relocation cases are complex and getting advice immediately from a top lawyer is critical.

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The holiday season is a time for reflection and for appreciating our abundance. But there are many families and people in our own communities that have do not have abundance in their life – whether that be in financial security, stable home, or a solid network of people to rely on in time of need.

In Canada we are fortunate to have The Salvation Army (TSA) who provide essential services and compassionate care to people –  in Vancouver and throughout BC –  who are facing poverty, addiction, homelessness, abuse and other situations where they need support.   TSA serves all people irrespective of race, religion, and orientation, without discrimination.

The Salvation Army has many programs:

• Shelter services
• Addiction and recovery programs
• Transitional Housing
• Family Services
• Youth, seniors and women’s programming
• Life skills and job training
• Emergency Disaster Services
• Daily food programs – 1.5 million meals for the hungry served in BC last year
• Emergency shelter and extreme cold weather shelters
• Palliative Care

A few facts:

• TSA operates 24/7.
• 86 Cents of every dollar is invested in programs and services to help those in need.
• 13% of shelter users are between the ages of 18 and 24, while 36% are between the ages of  35 and 44.
• In 2012 close to 9,000 people in Canada were helped by The Salvation Army when disaster struck.
• TSA is always looking for volunteers

Everyday, peoples life are transformed daily by having the Kate Booth House available for women escaping violent relationships, Harbour Light house for people who are trying to overcome addictions, to immigrating families who are struggling and Belkin House which provides shelter for those who find themselves homeless.

Everyone can help by donating time, treasure or talent to The Salvation Army.  If you wish to join MacLean Law in supporting the good work of the Salvation Army, donations can be made online, calling or stopping by a volunteer fill the kettle station.

Online:     fillthekettle.com

Call:         1800-sal-army

Giving Hope Today

Lorne MacLean and the staff at MacLean Law would like to wish everyone a happy, prosperous holiday season and a peaceful 2015.

The post The Salvation Army Gives A Helping Hand to Famililes appeared first on MacLean Family Law.

Call Our Fort St John High Net Worth Family Lawyers at 250-262-5052

Fort St John and Dawson Creek High Net Worth Income and Asset family lawyer, Lorne MacLean, QC

Fort St John family lawyer and Vancouver senior lawyer Lorne MacLean, QC is the founder of MacLean Law, one of the top rated family law firms in Canada. Mr. MacLean leads our 15 lawyer family law team and handles our most complex and challenging family law cases involving high income, high net worth, family business division, family  and trust division, corporate rollover and reorganization to minimize taxes on separation  and foreign asset cases. When you need a highly rated Fort St John high net worth family lawyer you need to call MacLean Law at 250-262-5052 to meet with us at our downtown Fort St John office. Watch Lorne MacLean, QC to see if he’s right for you.

Top Rated Family lawyers Really Help

Lorne  MacLean QC is one of the top 25 rated lawyers in North America according to ratings from satisfied clients at lawyerratingz.com. MacLean Law was ranked top Vancouver family law firm by Top Choice Awards and the firm has a multiple 5 star google reviews rating. MacLean and his legal team have helped their clients win a number of leading cases in the Supreme Court of Canada and BC Court of Appeal including leading Canadian  cases on child custody, spousal and child support and family property division cases. Clients who need a experienced and firm Fort St John High Net Worth Family Lawyer  to provide them legal advice to resolve their family case should call MacLean Law. Delay is never a good thing in a family law case.

Lorne MacLean QC Provides Critical Advice To High Net Worth North Peace Family Law Clients

Lorne MacLean, QC understands that a Fort St John or Dawson Creek business, proprietorship or professional practice is often the “Golden Goose” that supports all of the family members. MacLean also knows that ill-timed or improperly framed restraining orders, spousal interference with financing and other obstructionist tactics can scare away key business  partners, banks, joint venture investors and cause profits to vaporize and losses to mount.

Tenacious Representation By MacLean

Lorne MacLean, QC has over 30 years’ experience at tenaciously resolving complex property valuations, family and excluded  property division, tax matters, periodic and lump sum spousal and child support, trust valuations and family debt issues.

MacLean Law will help protect our separated Fort St John and Dawson Creek high net worth individuals from disaster upon marriage or relationship breakdown. High net worth family law clients cannot afford a misstep and we are there to protect your rights and to ensure you continue to earn income and profits with as little distraction and interference as possible. Mr. MacLean handles married or common law spouses’ (to qualify as a common law spouse the parties must have lived together in a “marriage like” relationship for a continuous period of at least two years) property division, spousal support and child support claims as well as difficult child parenting cases.

Lorne MacLean, QC would be happy to meet with you at his Fort St John BC office immediately to discuss:

• What is excluded versus family property
• Asset and wealth protection strategies regarding personal, company and trust assets
• What happens to property registered in both names
• Why you may need a marriage or cohabitation agreement
• What significant unfairness means when property division is decided
• Whether you are in a spousal relationship that means spousal support is payable?
• What a spouse earning over $150,000 pays as child support and when it ends
• What a spouse earning over 350,000 pays as spousal support and when it ends?
• How is spousal support decided if there are no children, children, or you share the raising of your children
• Does a spouse have to become self-sufficient?
• What happens on remarriage or cohabitation with new spouses on support?
• Retirement issues
• Change of income issues
• Failure to pay support issues
• spouses wanting to move away with my child

Our team of lawyers is here to help you overcome challenging circumstance arising from marriage breakdown which are far more complex and risky when high income and assets are involved. When the stakes are high -you need to demand the best legal representation possible. You deserve top legal support from a senior Vancouver lawyer who regularly acts in Fort St John and Dawson Creek BC.

Contact Lorne MacLean, QC now so you can begin to successfully move forward. Our Fort St John high net worth family lawyer legal team is ready to help you protect your hard earned income and assets.

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